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Abstract 
The European Union (EU) sustainability policy has in the last decades directed several efforts 
to promote sustainable forms of energy production. This topic brings together environmental 
concerns and technological innovation, two domains traditionally seen as opposite. To help 
understand how the publics mobilize for this debate, we examined the Science & Technology 
(S&T) and Public Understanding of Science (PUS) 2010 Eurobarometer resorting to a multi-
level approach. We examined the role of both cultural aspects, like worldviews and 
institutional trust, and country-level distinctions, namely the stage of accession to EU. Results 
show that support for both solar and nuclear technologies are (positively) predicted mainly by 
institutional trust. Moreover, egalitarians and those who prefer the lifestyle change solution 
for climate change are the ones more supportive of solar energy and less supportive of nuclear 
energy. Active involvement in S&T and Environmental matters is mostly dependent on the 
level of awareness about environmental problems, but is also related to believing that 
technology will provide inexhaustible resources. At the contextual-level, we found that newer 
EU member-states are less supportive of solar energy, more supportive of nuclear energy and 
less actively engaged in civic participation than older EU member-states. The findings 
highlight the intricate liaison between environmental and technological matters in the public 
debate about energy production and bring to the fore the relevance of legal innovation as 
determinant of value change. 
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Introduction 
The issue of energy production is at the core of many debates about climate change 
mitigation, as well as of many other discussions regarding our future. At the European Union 
(EU) level, governance efforts have in the last decades been directed to promoting the 
adoption of renewable forms of energy production (solar, wind), a trend that, to a lesser or 
greater extent, is mirrored at the national level. More recently, however, the importance 
attributed to climate change has contributed to alter discourses and positions regarding 
another energy technology: nuclear energy. In recent years, and due to its relatively low 
carbon emission, nuclear energy production has been included in the EU energy policy 
programme as a sustainable way of limiting the effects of climate change (EU, 2012). At this 
point, then, both the production of renewable (solar, wind) energy and the production of 
nuclear energy bring together two domains that have traditionally been seen as opposed: 
environmental concerns and technological innovations (Xiao, 2011). It is therefore important 
to have a clearer picture of how the debate about these energies is unfolding in the European 
Union context and how the EU publics are mobilizing for it.  
This paper focuses on the European Union context, which now comprises a 
considerable number of countries that vary in historical and cultural traditions and forms of 
social organisation. Some aspects of this cultural and social heterogeneity are traditionally 
captured by notions such as worldviews and values, which express generic goals and priorities 
that individuals, groups and societies deem important (Dunlap, 2008; Lima & Castro, 2005). 
These broad aspects influence in turn levels of trust in governments and awareness of 
environmental problems (Gaskell et al., 2010, 2011). The goals of the paper are threefold. 
First, we investigate how such cultural aspects promote support for renewable energy 
production (versus nuclear energy). Second, it is examined the extent to which citizens are 
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involved in debating these solutions and how actively they participate in the actions that help 
define the relations between science and the environment.  
Third, and in addition to the prior aspects, we include a supra-national perspective. 
Besides being characterised by cultural heterogeneity, the 27 EU member-states are also ruled 
by shared and homogeneous laws and regulations emanating from a supra-national level. This 
governance through policy-legal innovations - such as new directives dictating the appropriate 
forms of dealing with climate change and establishing the targets to be attained regarding the 
reduction of carbon emissions - is also expected to impact on the formats of public 
engagement with science (Wynne, 2007). Because the time frame, or longevity, of exposure 
to innovation is a crucial dimension of processes of social change (Castro, 2012), the potential 
tensions between cultural specificities and new policies and laws are better understood if we 
consider the phase of accession of each country to the EU. We expect that in older member-
states, which have been exposed to EU directives and EU “soft laws” (Frykman & Morth, 
2004) for longer periods, the public opinion would be more aligned to EU policies than in 
newer member-states.   
The following sections detail these proposals and illustrate why besides examining the 
cultural trends expressed in values, trust and awareness in these matters, it is also important to 
see how supra-national (EU) governance efforts intervene in the positions taken by national 
audiences.  
 
Public representations of new (and old) policies for tackling climate change 
As mentioned, EU policies for energy production establish EU Directives, which need 
to be translated into national laws. These, in turn, then bind governments to attain certain 
goals and targets, such as the reduction of carbon emissions to tackle climate change. The EU 
publics are thus submitted to a type of legal innovation which emanates from supra-national 
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sources and is then translated to national and local spheres (Beck, 2009; Castro & Mouro, 
2011). This means that different societies with different cultural traditions need to 
accommodate the same goals and priorities, and that very heterogeneous publics are expected 
to change their positions and discourses towards the similar energy options proposed by their 
national policies as these integrate the EU Directives. Importantly, many of these new laws 
also force changes in intergroup relations in the public sphere (for instance between 
institutions and citizens, between environmentalists and economists, etc), creating resistance 
and new conflicts (Castro, 2012). As climate change became a very salient issue for societies, 
public support for policies aimed at tackling its effects became also increasingly relevant 
(Lorenzoni & Pidgeon, 2006), and not always easily predictable. In our view, this is a very 
interesting scenario for examining the sense-making processes in which the publics engage in 
order to respond to complex societal demands (Castro, 2006; Kalampalikis & Haas, 2008; 
Moscovici, 1988), and react to change. 
Moreover, what is being asked of the EU public sphere regarding sustainable energy 
production has controversial dimensions. Current EU policy proposals combine new forms of 
energy production, using solar or wind power, with re-definitions of “traditional” ones, like 
nuclear energy. To meet the goal of a 20% cut in carbon emissions by 2020, the EU decided 
to increase the share of nuclear energy beyond the current 33%. Thus, new policies and 
directives not only explicitly articulate two dimensions that have usually been seen as 
opposed in public inquiries - environmental concern and attitudes towards technologies (Xiao, 
2011) – but also propose a re-frame in the evaluation of a traditionally considered high-risk 
technology, i.e. nuclear energy.  
Gaskell et al. (2011) traced the optimism directed at different technologies across 
Europe from 1991 to 2010. Overall, the trends seem to reflect a widespread concern about 
climate change and sustainability. For wind and solar energy the optimists largely outnumber 
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the sceptics, and optimism has been increasing over the years. In line with the new 
interpretation of nuclear energy, nuclear power shows an increase in support over recent years 
(Gaskell et al., 2011, although it must be noted that the last round of data collection occurred 
before the March 2011 Fukushima Daiichi accident). In 2010 European optimists and sceptics 
of nuclear energy equalled in number. Studies in the UK (for a review see Spence, Pidgeon, & 
Uzzell, 2008) and the US (Whitfield et al., 2009) suggest considerable ambivalence – and at 
best 'reluctant acceptance' - of nuclear power despite the renewed enthusiasm for nuclear 
power in some policy circles. This suggests, on one side, that the public sphere is somehow 
aware of the nation-level debates and integrates, in its representations and discourses, the new 
possibilities issued by the policy-legal sphere. On the other side, it seems that the future 
development of nuclear energy represents one of the most controversial issues at present.  
This is then a moment particularly relevant for comparing solar and nuclear energy 
and have a better understanding of the direction of public support in this debate. The tensions 
arising from the debate are examined by comparing the role of psychosocial predictors 
usually considered in this domain, such as institutional trust and values (for a review see 
Gupta, Fischer, & Frewer, 2011). Values are here understood as goals and priorities organized 
in generic worldviews. According to Cultural Theory (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982) these 
worldviews result from peoples’ socialization and participation in different forms of social 
organization; according to the social representations approach they also emerge from and are 
maintained through communication and debate, activities that become especially important in 
times of change and innovation (Castro, 2006). The four worldviews defined by Cultural 
theory - Egalitarian, Hierarchic, Individualistic and fatalistic – comprise and prioritize 
different goals. The egalitarian worldview prioritizes equality of rights, and the individualistic 
worldview prioritizes individual freedom of choice. Importantly, egalitarians are more likely 
to worry about technological risks than individualists (Wildavsky & Dake, 1990; Lima & 
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Castro, 2005). These worldviews were thus assessed in this study, and other predictors 
include variables specifically related to environmental awareness and technological optimism 
(Lima, Barnett & Vala, 2005; see also Gaskell et al., 2010), traditionally related to the 
worldviews. We also address the topic of how active engagement with technological and 
environmental issues is predicted by these cultural trends.  
We expect that the patterns of association would, in general, be reversed for the two 
types of energy production: solar energy would be positively predicted by egalitarian values 
and environmental awareness, while nuclear energy would be negatively associated with these 
variables. We also expect institutional trust to play a key role on these sense-making 
processes, but a reverse association between trust and support for each of the examined 
energies might not be the case. As both energies represent supra-national and governmental 
initiatives, their public defence would, in each case, be positively associated with institutional 
trust. Egalitarianism and environmental awareness would also predict high civic engagement 
in S&T and environmental issues, while institutional trust and civic engagement would be 
negatively associated. 
 
The contribution of supra-national regulations for change  
During recent years, EU environmental policy has been strongly based not just on the 
establishment of EU Directives to be translated to national laws, but also on “soft law” 
instruments (Frykman & Morth, 2004). These “soft law” instruments require national 
governments to organize campaigns and educational efforts, and to produce documents aimed 
at promoting and advancing the EU recommendations in the country (Baker, 2007; Frykman 
& Morth, 2004). These instruments have been used since the early days of the European 
integration as a form of achieving a certain homogenisation of goals in the member-states 
without binding them directly (Frykman & Morth, 2004).The Directives and soft laws are 
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then the two legal-policy pillars on which the effort for the homogenisation of values across 
the EU rests. However, some countries have been members since the foundation, which 
happened sixty years ago, while others acceded very recently, already in the XXI century; this 
means that different sets of countries have been distinctively exposed to EU policies and EU 
“soft laws” – i.e. codes of conduct, recommendations, campaigns or declarations (Frykman & 
Morth, 2004) – on which much of EU governance has been based. Consequently, the publics 
of member-states with different accession years have been differently exposed to campaigns, 
recommendations and laws regarding environmental matters; this means that the internal 
debates in each country about these issues also have different longevities and levels of 
maturity, and this possibly positions their publics in different ways.  
In this paper we put forward the hypothesis that different levels of exposure to EU soft 
laws affect the positions taken by individuals regarding energy policies. The examination of 
this hypothesis contributes to understanding how supra-national efforts of governance for 
environmental sustainability relate to public support for sustainable energy production. More 
precisely we expect that recent member-states are less favourable of renewable energies than 
those that have been governed by EU directives and soft laws for a longer time. Shared 
assumptions about how the world is, and should be, represent the background against which 
technological innovation is interpreted and evaluated. The very same information may lead to 
different interpretation and evaluation, depending on how it is integrated into a group or 
nation's network of understandings. Such cultural and historical traditions will determine 
whether and to what degree concerns (e.g., environmental concerns) are salient and available 
to the individuals in the collective. Sunstein (2006) suggests that such salience, in 
combination with social psychological phenomena such as cascade effects, can accrue to 
cultural differences, such as European nations being more concerned about climate change 
than the United States. A characteristic of social cascades is that people both are influenced 
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by a social signal and at the same time contribute to amplifying it. Similarly, in conversations 
with like-minded others, people tend to move toward more extreme versions of the views with 
which they started the conversation (see also Kronberger, Holtz, & Wagner, 2012). As a result 
of the duration of exposure to EU soft laws, the salience of environmental concern should 
differ in older and newer member-states, and aggravated by discourse dynamics, citizens 
should come to differ in their support of renewable energies. 
Moreover, because soft laws can have different interpretations – a more instrumental 
versus a more deliberative reading (Frykman & Morth, 2004) – it is also relevant to examine 
whether exposure to soft laws results in more or less engagement in civic involvement 
activities directed to issues enmeshing technology and environmental matters. If we assume 
that EU soft laws work as rules for deliberation that foster debate and the involvement of 
citizens, then individuals in countries that entered the EU more recently would be less 
involved in these types of action than those who have been governed by these laws for a 
longer time. If EU soft laws are instead promoting an emphasis on hierarchic decision-
making, made by representatives, then the phase of accession to EU as a member-state would 
not predict different levels of involvement in civic actions. 
In sum, this paper examines the joint role of (1) cultural aspects - values, trust, 
awareness of environmental problems and technological optimism -, measured at the 
individual-level, and (2) phase of accession in EU, a country-level variable, in predicting 
support for both solar and nuclear energies and civic engagement regarding these issues. We 
will now present the methodological details of the multilevel models that will be used for 
testing our assumptions.   
 
Method 
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Participants and procedure 
The data analysed stem from two modules within the 2010 Eurobarometer Survey: 
Life Sciences and Biotechnology (S&T) and Public Understanding of Science (PUS). The 
survey was conducted in 32 European countries using national representative samples of 
citizens aged 15 years and over (near 1000 participants per country). Given research our 
objectives, only data from EU member-states were included in this study (n=27 countries). 
The total sample for this study is of 26671 respondents.  
The participants were interviewed face-to-face, in their own homes and in appropriate 
national language. A detailed description of the data collection procedures is presented 
elsewhere (Gaskell et al., 2010).  
 
Measures 
As mentioned above, the analyses included variables from the modules S&T and PUS 
of the Eurobarometer. We focused mainly on variables related to environment, sustainability 
and climate change, the guiding interests of the paper, but also used variables related to values 
and institutional relations. 
 
 Independent variables 
Worldview is a variable that resulted from a set of three forced-choice questions measuring 
goals and priorities (S&T: 1.“The Government should take responsibility to ensure that new 
technologies benefit everyone” versus 2.“It is up to people to seek out the benefits from new 
technologies themselves”; 3.“Protecting freedom of speech and human rights” versus 
4.“Fighting crime and terrorism”; 5.“Having strong European companies to compete in global 
markets” versus 6.“Reducing economic inequalities among people in the European Union”) 
and organized according to the premises of Cultural Theory (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982). 
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This variable was dummy coded with “egalitarians” coded 1 and “others” coded 0. 
Egalitarians (30.8% of the sample) value upmost human rights and reducing economic 
inequalities (3. and 6.); importantly, the egalitarian worldview is most likely to involve 
worries about technological risks (Wildavsky & Dake, 1990). This is less likely for 
hierarchists (32.7% in the sample) who value state intervention (1. and 4.), and for 
individualists (5.3%) who value a free market (2. and 5.). In the sample 31.2% of respondents 
take a mixed positioning.  
Institutional trust combines the evaluation of national governments and the EU regarding the 
preparation of laws about new technologies (S&T: “Government making laws about 
biotechnology”; “The European Union making laws about biotechnology for all EU Member 
States”) into a single score (r=.51, p<.001). Higher scores reflect higher trust (1- not doing a 
good job for society to 2- doing a good job for society; M=1.78, SD=.37).  
Awareness of environmental problems aggregates two items regarding the levels of interest in 
and information about environmental problems (PUS: “Feel interested in environmental 
problems”; “Feel informed about environmental problems”) into a single score (r=.46, p<.01; 
M=2.09, SD=.54). Higher scores reflect higher interest (1-not at all interested/informed to 3-
very interested/informed).  
Climate change options regards the choice between two solutions for dealing with climate 
change (S&T: “To halt climate change and global warming we will have to rethink our ways 
of living even if it means lower economic growth in our country” versus “Technology will 
find a way to stop climate change and global warming so that we can maintain our way of life 
and have economic growth”), and is a dummy variable, with “change of lifestyle ” coded 1 
and “technological solution” coded 0. 
Technology provides inexhaustible resources evaluates the agreement with the item “Thanks 
to scientific and technological advances the Earth’s natural resources will be inexhaustible” 
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(PUS). Higher scores reflect higher agreement with this idea (1-totally disagree to 5-totally 
agree; M=2.45, SD=1.20). 
Phase of accession to the EU is an additional predictive variable that was added to the data-
base. This is a contextual-level variable that organizes different clusters of countries. This 
variable has five levels: 1-1952 (six countries: Germany, Italy, Belgium, Luxembourg and 
The Netherlands), 2-1973 (three countries: Denmark, Ireland and United Kingdom), 3-1981-
86 (three countries: Greece, Portugal and Spain), 4-1995 (three countries: Austria, Finland 
and Sweden), 5-2004-2007 (12 countries: Cyprus, Slovakia, Slovenia, Estonia, Hungary, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Czech Republic, Bulgaria and Romania). 
 
Dependent variables 
The main goals were to examine how this set of variables helped explaining levels of 
support for (1) two different types of energy – a renewable energy (solar) and nuclear energy- 
and (2) levels of engagement in participatory actions regarding technology and environmental 
matters.  
Support for solar energy was measured using a three-point scale (S&T: “Do you think solar 
energy will have a positive, a negative or no effect on our way of life in the next 20 years?” 1-
negative effect to 3-positive effect); higher scores correspond to a more optimistic perspective 
about the effects of using solar energy (M=2.85, SD=.47).  
Support for nuclear energy was measured in the same way (S&T: “Do you think nuclear 
energy will have a positive, a negative or no effect on our way of life in the next 20 years?”); 
in this case, higher scores correspond to a more optimistic perspective about the effects of 
using nuclear energy (1-negative effect to 3-positive effect; M=2.02, SD=.94). 
Active involvement in technology and environment issues (PUS) aggregates the frequency of 
engagement in attending meetings, signing petitions and participating in NGOs activities 
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linked with technological and environmental issues (α=.72; mean inter-item r=.47; M=1.32, 
SD=.54). Higher scores correspond to higher levels of active involvement (1-never to 4-
regularly). 
 
Results 
Bridging the gap between macro- and micro-level analyses is a major task for socio-
psychological research (Jagodzinski, 2004). Multilevel techniques are specially designed to 
analyse variables from different levels simultaneously (Hox, 2010), thus allowing to study 
how context affect individual level attitudes and behaviours. Four successive multilevel 
regression models were estimated (Hox, 2010) for each dependent variable, using PASW 
Statistics 18: model 1 - no explanatory variable; model 2 - individual level variables; model 3 
- individual- and contextual-level variables; and model 4 - individual- and contextual-level 
variables with random effects. All explanatory variables were centred around the grand mean 
and the maximum likelihood method was used to calculate the estimates (Hox, 2010). Table 1 
and 2 present the best models obtained, which include variables at the two hierarchical levels 
– individual and contextual – and account for random effects variance.  
 
Support for solar and nuclear energy  
First, the multilevel models of “support for solar energy” and “support for nuclear 
energy” are compared. As Table 1 shows, both are (positively) predicted mainly by 
institutional trust. This means that individuals who have more confidence in national and 
European laws concerning technology issues are also more prone to support investments in 
solar and nuclear energy.  
For the remaining variables the relationships are, in most cases, reverted for the two 
types of energy production. Namely, egalitarians and those who prefer the lifestyle change 
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solution for climate change are more willing to support solar energy but less willing to 
support nuclear energy than the non-egalitarians and those who prefer the technological 
solution.  
Additionally, support for solar energy is predicted by higher interest in environmental 
problems, while support for nuclear energy is predicted by the idea that technology provides 
inexhaustible resources.  
 
Insert Table 1 
 
At the contextual-level, the relationship between phases of accession to the EU and 
support for different energy solutions is also reverted for the two technological options. More 
specifically, newer EU member-states are less supportive of solar energy and more supportive 
of nuclear energy than older EU member-states. This is in line with our hypothesis stating that 
countries which have a longer history of debate and law-issuing regarding environmental 
sustainability would have higher levels of support for the type of energy the EU has been 
encouraging in the last years, namely renewable energies.  
 
Active involvement 
A further goal was to examine how the same variables helped explaining the adoption 
of participatory actions regarding technological and environmental matters. The results in 
Table 2 indicate that active involvement is best predicted by awareness of environmental 
problems. Endorsing egalitarian values and having low trust in government and EU also 
contribute to engaging in participatory actions. 
However, active involvement is also related to believing that technology will provide 
inexhaustible resources and to support for nuclear energy (but not for solar energy). This 
15 
 
means that the active involvement in actions supporting/rejecting certain solutions for 
technology and environmental matters is to be expected more from those supporting nuclear 
energy and assuming that technology is able to solve environmental problems. This is 
coherent also with the fact that EU policy has in the last years been expressively directed to 
support renewable energies, which may help explain why the public does not see the need for 
more involvement in the advancement of these energies.  
At the contextual-level, we see that the newer EU member-states are less actively 
involved in these actions than the older EU member-states. This leaves the question of 
knowing whether in time the newer member-states will also increase their level of 
involvement and interest in environmental information.  
 
Insert Table 2 
 
Phase of accession and country-level indicators 
To better understand how the pressures introduced by supra-national governance 
interfere with the contextual or country-level debates, we constructed second order indicators 
to correlate with the phases of accession to the EU. For example, in the climate change 
question, we worked with a variable resulting from the subtraction of the percentage of those 
choosing the option “technological solution” from the percentage of those choosing the option 
“change of lifestyle”. This type of variables gives an indication of the direction of the tensions 
and debates in the country. In other cases (questions answered in a 4 or 5 point scale) we used 
the aggregate mean for the country. The results are presented in table 3.  
The relations found support and help understand the results found with the multilevel 
analysis. As shown, support for solar energy and nuclear energy have opposite relations with 
the phase of accession to the EU; the countries in the earlier phases of accession are more 
16 
 
optimistic regarding solar energy and more pessimistic regarding nuclear energy. In general, 
Europeans are much less divided in their view of solar energy than of nuclear energy. Despite 
stronger support in the eldest member-states, for solar energy there is a clear surplus of 
optimists in both the eldest and newest member states. For nuclear energy, in contrast, there is 
a surplus of critics in the eldest member states, while there is a surplus of supporters in the 
newest member states. Also as previously stated, active involvement in technology and 
environmental issues is less likely in countries that have entered the EU more recently.  
 
Insert Table 3 
 
Figure 1 illustrates the trend for lower support of nuclear energy in the earlier member-states 
compared to countries that more recently joined the EU.  
 
Insert Figure 1 
 
Besides confirming the results of the multilevel analysis, the correlations also show 
that the phase of accession affects a set of variables used as predictors in the former analysis: 
institutional trust, interest in environmental information and options for dealing with climate 
change. These results indicate that older EU member-states have slightly less trust in national 
and European laws regarding new technologies, are more interested in information about 
environmental problems and have audiences less divided regarding the solutions for climate 
change (the majority chooses the lifestyle solution). There seems then to be a homogenisation 
of values and worldviews amongst older member-states, coherent with the goals of a type of 
governance based not only on traditional binding laws but on supra-national soft law 
instruments. 
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Discussion  
In summary, the results show that while institutional trust increases the support to all 
forms of energy production, worldviews determine the differential support of different 
technologies (solar versus nuclear energy). Moreover, the results show that the supra-national 
model of governance adopted by the European Union seems to influence the positions 
towards sustainable energies of citizens in different sets of countries, which joined the EU in 
different decades. The multi-level analyses presented highlight that in countries that joined 
the EU in later phases of its existence, citizens are less likely to support renewable energies 
but more likely to endorse nuclear energy. In combination with the finding that in these newer 
accession states citizens are less likely to report having participated in actions such as 
attending meetings, signing petitions or participating in NGO activities, these results lend 
support to our hypothesis that in these younger EU member-states awareness and support of 
sustainable energy are lower than in older member-states. Correlations at the country level 
corroborate the findings. Later accession relates to lower awareness of and interest in 
environmental problems, to more confidence in technological solutions to mitigate climate 
change and ultimately to more support for nuclear energy and less support for solar energy. 
The degree of trust in national and EU governing bodies is higher in these countries while the 
likelihood of active citizen engagement is lower.  
The results highlight the role of time in value change, which must be considered a 
slow process. Social psychological research has hitherto paid little attention to the role legal 
innovation plays in stimulating value change (Castro, 2012), but these results show its 
importance. Exposure to EU hard and soft law over time, and in combination with collective – 
formal and informal – deliberation seem to heighten the salience of environmental issues, and 
ultimately the support of different forms of energy production. Many open questions remain 
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though. What factors accelerate or slow down the homogenisation of values across different 
countries? What is the expected time-scale of such change? Although further data and 
analyses are needed to address such questions, our results show that at least in European 
countries concerns for the environment and sustainability have become an important 
background for evaluating science and technology (Xiao, 2011). Of course the publics in 
different countries are not passive recipients of change but actively re-construct the messages 
suggested by supra-national soft law and translated to their country's context by national 
actors. On the basis of cultural and historical predispositions, collective discourse dynamics 
may accelerate or slow down, and downplay or highlight the awareness of particular 
concerns. Our data seem to suggest, for example, that while renewable energy production is 
widely welcomed across European member-states, citizens seem more reluctant to endorse 
nuclear energy, even if in policy circles the technology has experienced a 'renaissance' due to 
its promise of mitigating climate change. Interestingly, institutional trust is particularly 
relevant for taking a position towards nuclear energy, suggesting that citizens are paying 
special attention to what their governments and the EU are proposing in this matter to take a 
position. Thus, while European policy is increasingly legitimized in terms of public values 
such as a concern for the environment (von Schomberg, forthcoming), the values mirrored in 
European publics' evaluation of technologies have come to reflect such concern. The degree 
and nature of such influence, however, is subject to transformation processes in which the 
supra-national guidelines are translated and adapted to more local contexts. The result is 
cultural variation, constituting a major challenge to European governance.  
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Table 1. Multilevel models of support for solar energy and for nuclear energy 
Fixed effects Support for solar energy Support for nuclear energy 
 B SE B SE 
Individual-level predictors 
Intercept  ,09* ,04 -,23* ,10 
Climate change options ,02** ,01 -,11*** ,01 
Worldview (Egalitarian) ,03*** ,01 -,09*** ,01 
Institutional trust ,14*** ,02 ,25*** ,03 
Awareness of 
environmental problems 
,04*** ,01 (a) (a) 
Technology provides 
inexhaustible resources 
(a) (a) ,07*** ,01 
Contextual-level predictor 
Phase of accession to the 
EU 
-,02* ,01 ,04* ,02 
Random effects Variance Wald Z Variance Wald Z 
Individual-level Intercept ,204*** 100,945 ,801*** 98,046 
Contextual-level Intercept ,007** 3,397 ,044** 3,445 
Trust slope ,013** 3,081 ,013* 2,049 
Deviance 26531,397 50605,229 
Estimated parameters 9 9 
* p<.05 ** p<.01 *** p<.001 (* p<.10 for contextual-level variable). (a) excluded from the 
model due to non-significant results.  
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Table 2. Multilevel model of active involvement in S&T and environmental issues 
Fixed effects Active involvement in S&T and 
environmental issues 
 B SE 
Individual-level predictors 
Intercept  ,15** ,05 
Worldview (Egalitarian) ,05*** ,01 
Trust Government & EU -,08** ,03 
Awareness of environmental problems ,23*** ,01 
Technology provides inexhaustible resources ,04*** ,01 
Support for solar energy -,04 ns 
Support for nuclear energy ,02*** ,00 
Contextual-level predictor 
Phase of entry in EU -,03* ,01 
Random effects Variance Wald Z 
Individual-level Intercept ,276*** 100,341 
Contextual-level Intercept ,010** 3,381 
Trust slope ,014** 2,960 
Interest slope ,005** 2,683 
Public involvement slope ,001** 2,462 
Deviance 31674,127 
Estimated parameters 12 
* p<.05 ** p<.01 *** p<.001 
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Table 3. Correlations between “Phase of accession to the EU” and country-level indicators 
Variables Country-level indicator R with Phase of 
accession to the 
EU 
Values for 
Phases 1 and 5 
Support for solar energy  % optimists minus % 
pessimists 
-.36* 85% vs. 76% 
Support for nuclear energy  % optimists minus % 
pessimists 
.40* -11% vs. 10% 
Active involvement in 
S&T and environmental 
issues  
aggregate mean for 
country 
-.48** 1,39 vs. 1,23 
Institutional trust aggregate mean for 
country 
.31 1,77 vs. 1,80 
Awareness of 
environmental problems  
aggregate mean for 
country 
-.36* 2,22 vs. 2,03 
Climate change options  % choosing lifestyle 
change solution minus 
% choosing 
technological solution 
-.43** 43% vs. 20% 
Spearman correlations:
  p<.10 * p<.05 ** p<.01 (one-tailed)  
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Figure 1. Levels of Support for nuclear energy in the 27 EU member-states by Phase of 
accession to the EU 
 
 
 
